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ABSTRACT
We summarize the potential nature and scope of economic effects of climate change inAlaska that have already
occurred and are likely tobecomemanifest over thenext 30–50 years.Weclassifiedpotential effects discussed in the
literature into categories according to climate driver, type of environmental service affected, certainty and timing of
the effects, and potential magnitude of economic consequences. We then described the nature of important eco-
nomic effects andprovidedestimates of larger,more certain effects forwhichdatawere available. Largest economic
effects were associated with costs to prevent damage, relocate, and replace infrastructure threatened by permafrost
thaw, sea level rise, and coastal erosion. The costs to infrastructure were offset by a large projected reduction in
space heating costs attributable tomilderwinters.Overall, we estimated that five relatively certain, large effects that
could be readily quantifiedwould impose an annual net cost of $340–$700million, or 0.6%–1.3%ofAlaska’sGDP.
This significant, but relativelymodest, net economic effect forAlaska as awhole obscures large regional disparities,
as rural communities face large projected costs while more southerly urban residents experience net gains.
1. Background
a. Economic effects of climate change in Alaska
High northern latitudes are warming much faster than
more temperate zones. Alaska has warmed more than
twice as rapidly as the rest of the United States (Taylor
et al. 2017), with statewide average annual air temperature
increasing by 1.58C and average winter temperature by
more than 38C since the 1950s (Walsh et al. 2014) A series
of synthesis reports have documented and summarized a
wide range of effects of recent and projected warming
on the physical environment, ecosystems, and human ac-
tivities (ACIA 2004; Larsen and Fondahl 2014; Chapin
et al. 2014; Hovelsrud et al. 2011; Larsen et al. 2014).
Although these effects of a warming climate are bound to
have consequences for the economy, considerably less is
known specifically about the economic effects.
We addressed this information gap by describing the
potential nature and scope of economic effects of climate
change that have already occurred and are likely to be-
come manifest in Alaska over the next 30–50 years. We
compiled effects arising through a broad spectrum of
drivers and mechanisms using a common framework and
divided potential economic effects into categories ac-
cording to a number of criteria. We begin by briefly re-
viewing the mechanisms by which global climate change
generates local and regional economic effects and how
much regional warming is anticipated.We then discuss our
approach to classify economic consequences of climate
change impacts discussed in the literature. Next, we pres-
ent the results of the classification and provide preliminary
impact estimates, along with data sources and assump-
tions, of the subset of economic effects identified as
relatively large and certain. A discussion section places
the economic effects in the context of Alaska’s economy,
noting important regional disparities, primary uncertainties,
and known data gaps. The conclusion discusses implications
of the regional disparities for adaptation policy.
b. How global climate change generates local
economic effects
Alaska’s economy is primarily based on natural
resource extraction; federal, civilian, and military
spending; and tourism (BEA 2018; Goldsmith 2010;
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McDowell 2016). Oil production, commercial fishing,
and nature-based tourism are particularly important and
potentially affected by climate change. Many residents
of rural Alaska engage in a local mixed economy, bal-
ancing wage employment with subsistence hunting and
fishing activities (Goldsmith 2007) that are also vulner-
able to environmental change (IPCC 2007;Markon et al.
2012). However, as we note below, many of the most
important economic consequences of climate change
affect infrastructure and living conditions for the resi-
dent population and are not tied to any particular
economic sector.
Rising global temperatures and changes in pre-
cipitation have been linked to a variety of effects on
Alaska’s regional physical environments (Fig. 1), in-
cluding warmer, longer summers; shorter, milder win-
ters (Stewart et al. 2013; Wendler and Shulski 2009;
Wendler et al. 2012); increased precipitation (Stewart
et al. 2013); melting cryosphere and glaciers (Berthier
et al. 2010; Jacob et al. 2012); thawing of the cryosphere
and permafrost (ACIA 2004; Avis et al. 2011; Jafarov
et al. 2012; Romanovsky et al. 2008); rising sea levels
(Nicholls et al. 2007); and more varied and stormy
weather (Pisaric et al. 2011; Terenzi et al. 2014; Vermaire
et al. 2013). The shrinking of the cryosphere due to
warming temperatures is already causing a variety of
changes to Alaska’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems
(ACIA 2004). Glacial melt affects availability of phos-
phorus, iron, and organic carbon to marine organisms
(Hood and Scott 2008; Hood et al. 2009; Schroth et al.
2011). Warmer ocean temperatures and circulation re-
locate suitable habitats for marine species (Barbeaux
et al. 2017; Cheung et al. 2009; Stabeno et al. 2005).
Changes in timing of the onset of seasonally warm
and cold temperatures change bird migration patterns
(Hezel et al. 2012). Warmer and drier conditions lead
to increased insect damage to forests (Berg et al. 2006;
Gordon et al. 2013; Wolken et al. 2011) and more fre-
quent and intense wildfires (Calef et al. 2015). In turn,
the changes in fire and insect regimes may accelerate the
spread of invasive species (Cortés-Burns et al. 2008;
Lapina and Carlson 2004), spread brush and trees to
formerly treeless landscapes (Jia et al. 2003; Sturm et al.
2001), and cause dominant forest vegetation to shift
from spruce to broadleaf trees (Barrett et al. 2011;
Johnstone et al. 2011).
These profound and diverse changes in the physical
environment and ecosystems generate economic
effects through their effects on environmental ser-
vices (ES; United Nations 1997). We use ES instead
of the more widely used term ‘‘ecosystem services’’—
the products of ecosystems that people value (Reid
et al. 2005)—because ES include benefits people
derive directly from the physical environment as
well as from ecosystems. As Fig. 1 illustrates, some
changes in ES result directly from changes in the
physical environment (e.g., temperature moderation,
stable ground supporting infrastructure, smooth sur-
face for transportation), while others arise indirectly
from effects on ecosystems of changes in the physical
environment.
We ignore potentially large global effects of Arctic
warming (Hope and Schaefer 2016) and focus instead
on local and regional effects. Economic effects of
changes in ES include use and nonuse values. Nonuse
values, such as existence value, are difficult to define
precisely and even more difficult to estimate. We
therefore focus this study on use values. Acknowledg-
ing the critical importance of cultural services to many
Alaskans, we exclude cultural effects from our defini-
tion of economic effects, except for market-based
economic activity related to recreation and tourism.
FIG. 1. Schematic for how global climate change generates local economic effects.
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c. Assumptions for warming
The 30–50-yr time horizon for the analysis corresponds
to the longest time frame generally used for planning
long-term investment decisions, such as to construct
new housing and commercial buildings, develop resource
deposits, and build public infrastructure. We use the
scenarios for warming included in the third U.S. National
Climate Assessment (NCA), which projects that average
annual temperatures in Alaska will rise by an additional
18–28C by 2050, regardless of greenhouse emission tra-
jectories (Walsh et al. 2014). More recent projections for
the fourth NCA (Hayhoe et al. 2017; Taylor et al. 2017)
appear quite similar to those of the third NCA, but in-
clude less detail for Alaska. As a rough guide, the pro-
jections suggest that the economic effects of warming
over the next 30–50 years will equal or exceed what has
occurred over the past 50 years. That said, we acknowl-
edge and note below that some changes may cross tipping
points, with potentially large ramifications. Since climate
change is already underway in Alaska, the economic
effects of climate change are cumulative effects, including
effects of warming that has already occurred. Although
projections past 2050 are much less certain, Alaska is
likely to warm by 38–48C in the north and 28–38C in the
rest of the state by the end of the century, even with
substantial emissions reductions (Walsh et al. 2014).
2. Methods
We take a multidimensional approach consistent with
Arent et al. (2014) to summarize what is known with
differing levels of certainty about the direction and
magnitude of the potential economic effects. The first
step is to enumerate projected effects of climate change
on land and marine temperatures, the cryosphere,
wildfire regimes, and terrestrial and marine ecosystems
that are likely to affect human activities.We use theU.S.
National Climate Assessment—Alaska Regional Tech-
nical Report (Markon et al. 2012) as a starting point to
identify potential environmental impacts, adding in-
formation from other relevant studies. We then describe
potential economic consequences of these changes in
the physical environment and ecosystems in qualitative
terms. While the list of potential effects is long, it is
likely incomplete.
Potential changes in ES affect people in diverse ways.
The climate impacts literature describes and projects
economic effects in a variety of ways, without a ‘‘com-
mon yardstick’’ to assess relative or overall significance,
creating a challenge for comparative studies. The
problem is further complicated by the fact that few
studies in the large body of literature on potential effects
of climate change inAlaska provide enough detail about
the climate and socioeconomic scenario assumptions
they used. This makes it difficult to adjust the projected
effects and perform comparisons with effects drawn
from other studies. The ability to generate a total figure
for the cost of climate change in Alaska is limited to
what is feasible, given what is known about effects
that can be quantified with some level of precision. We
proceed toward the goal of assessing overall significance
in several steps. First, we organize and evaluate poten-
tial economic effects by classifying impacts described
in the literature along eight criteria, or dimensions:
1) Physical and ecological drivers.
2) Effects on ES.
3) Level of certainty of ES effects.
4) Timing of ES effects.
5) How ES change affects the economy.
6) Magnitude of economic effects.
7) Sector most affected (households, businesses, or the
public sector).
8) Distribution of economic effect (i.e., change in
economic activity, change in business profits, change
in cost of living, change in cost of government).
Some effects are relatively assured and, in some cases,
are already occurring. Other impacts are highly un-
certain, due to their dependence on the structure of
global and regional economies and future human alter-
ations to the environment decades into the future. We
classify potential economic effects of the changes in ES
by high, medium, and low levels of certainty, based on
the certainty expressed in publications describing the
effects, and the level of agreement among studies.
Highly uncertain effects are those for which several
publications agree that large uncertainty exists, or for
which publications draw several or opposite conclusions
about the effects of regional warming. More certain ef-
fects are ones for which the science directly ties ES
changes to warming or greenhouse gas emissions, and
for which local economic effects are measurable and can
be distinguished from effects of other forces of change.
We use three size categories to classify magnitude of
effects. Large economic effects are likely to have an
annual (real, undiscounted) impact of $50 million or
greater. Small economic effects would likely have an
impact of less than $5 million annually, while medium
effects would be in the $5–$50 million range. The size
categories are broad—meant only to identify effects that
most warrant further analysis—because information to
assess magnitude of effects is often sparse. Where in-
formation about costs was lacking, we inferred order-of-
magnitude economic activity associated with changes in
ES by applying the authors’ professional judgment and
understanding of the structure of the Alaska economy.
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One case involves activities that could theoretically
benefit from warming, but whose expansion is currently
limited by nonclimate factors (e.g., commercial agri-
culture). Another case involves activities with available
close substitutes for a climate-affected ES, keeping the
net cost low. In still other cases, the economic effect
may be potentially large, but realized primarily outside
Alaska. Most of the economic effect of an increase in
marine shipping through Arctic waters, for example,
would likely occur in the Russian sector rather than
along Alaska’s coasts, due both to likely patterns of
trade and availability of deep-water ports.
From the classification results, we select economic
effects for quantification. These are effects that aremore
certain, already occurring or likely to occur in the rela-
tively near term, readily quantified, and can be mea-
sured appropriately in financial terms. We estimate
dollar values for this subset of effects to the extent data
are available. Methods vary for each effect and are
summarized with the presentation of results. As pro-
jected effects occur decades from now, one must make
assumptions about discounting of future costs. Different
studies in the literature applied different discount rates
across differing time horizons. To standardize figures
from studies using disparate assumptions, we converted
values projected in each study to annual average effects
in constant 2015 U.S. dollars, applying the discount rate
and time horizon used in that particular study. We also
discuss qualitatively the nature of potential economic
effects that are not appropriately measured in financial
terms such as subsistence harvests. For all effects in-
cluding those discussed only qualitatively, we indicate
the direction of effects, their sensitivity to climate
change, and the relative influence of climate versus
other drivers of change.
We use the gross domestic product (GDP) accounting
framework to quantify effects. Climate-related costs in
the GDP framework represent losses of real national
value added due to climate change. Projected changes in
value added depend on future prices of goods traded in
global markets. World market prices are highly un-
certain and could change due to various factors oper-
ating outside Alaska, including climate impacts in other
regions. Since too many uncertainties are present to
make reliable projections of relative prices of different
products and services, we project annual average values
using constant 2015 prices.
The market value added metric of GDP accounting,
although widely used, contains several well-known lim-
itations. The basic flaw is that not all economic effects of
climate change are measurable in value added terms.
Some costs to the nation may not appear as a loss to the
Alaskan economy and may even show up as an increase
in Alaskan value added if most of the costs are paid by
households, businesses, or taxpayers in other states. To
capture all the relevant effects, we describe separately
five categories of effects for households, businesses, and
the public sector:
d Change in value added in Alaska (value of shipments
less cost of inputs purchased from outside Alaska) for
specific industries.
d Change in household cost of living.
d Change in purchased input costs for businesses and
governments.
d Change in nonwage benefit flows to households, in-
cluding subsistence benefits.
d Change in value of buildings and infrastructure.1
The actual economic effects of climate change depend on
individual and collective decisions for adapting to the
changes in ES. We note where inferred effects depend
on assumptions about adaptation decisions and how differ-
ent assumptions might produce different results, when these
assumptions may be determined in the studies we review.
3. Results
a. Summary of economic effects by industry or sector
Appendix A in the online supplemental material
contains the detailed results of classification of economic
effects by climate driver, environmental service af-
fected, size and level of certainty, and how the effects are
distributed through the economy. Here, we summarize
the various effects by industry or sector experiencing the
economic impact.
1) HYDROPOWER
Melting glaciers (Berthier et al. 2010; Jacob et al.
2012) will increase the role of seasonal precipitation
patterns in determining hydroelectric capacity. River
discharge has been increasing during thewinter since the
1960s, but shows no trends in other seasons (Cherry et al.
2010). Because reservoirs are generally full in fall, in-
vestments to increase reservoir heights would be re-
quired to take advantage of increased fall precipitation.
Insufficient connectivity between locations and capacity
to share surplus power limits hydropower security more
than climate change risks (Cherry et al. 2010).
1 For comparison with other impacts, one could amortize the
change in asset values into annual flows over the life of the asset.
Since it is not common practice in GDP accounting to convert
capital gains and losses into annual flows of value added, we list
changes in asset values and changes in value added as separate
effects.
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2) TOURISM AND RECREATION
The Modified Climate Index for Tourism (MCIT) for
King Salmon and Anchorage showed an increase in sea-
son length for sightseeing, but no improvement in sea-
sonal weather quality (Yu et al. 2009). Shorter winter
seasons in south-central Alaska reduce sales for snow
sport businesses and increase snow-making costs for ski
areas, offset in part by an increase in quality because of
fewer extremely cold days. A projected increase in rainy
weather would discourage marine trips and hiking expe-
ditions in southeast Alaska (Colt et al. 2007; Gregory
et al. 2006). Because the effects on tourism and recreation
are complex and nuanced, additional studies using
detailed operator data are needed to determine net
effects.
3) ENERGY DEMAND
Warming winter temperatures have reduced the de-
mand for energy and associated costs to provide space
heating for Alaskan homes, businesses, and govern-
ments. National Weather Service (NWS) daily weather
data show that heating degree-days (HDD) have de-
clined substantially in most parts of the state from his-
torical levels (Fig. 2). Although Anchorage had the
largest percentage of HDD decline between 1950–79
and 2000–15, the absolute change was largest in
Utqia _gvik (Barrow; 1529 fewer annual HDDs). Since
1979, temperatures in Utqia _gvik have increased 3.88C
in September, 6.68C in October, and 5.58C in November
(Wendler et al. 2014). Increased cooling degree-days
(CDD) from warmer summer temperatures provide
only a small offset to the beneficial effect of lower
heating costs. NWS data show that CDD increased
from an annual average of 2 to 7 between 1950–79 and
2000–15 in Anchorage, and from 50 to 59 in Fairbanks.
Average annual CDD in the other sites listed in Fig. 2
were small (#3) and essentially unchanged.
4) AGRICULTURE
The growing season increased by 45% in interior
Alaska over the twentieth century (Wendler and Shulski
2009). That trend is expected to continue (Chapin et al.
2014), which will increase the feasibility of agricultural
activities within the state. Since northern areas in
Canada and Russia are experiencing a similar climate
benefit for agriculture and are geographically much
larger and generally closer to large market opportuni-
ties, it is unlikely that Alaska’s agricultural exports will
expand significantly over the next several decades. In-
stead, an increasing but still small share of food con-
sumed by Alaska’s residents may be grown locally,
with a slight increase in food security (Meter and Phillips
2014; USDA 2017). Farm incomes will rise, and more
businesses will be selling inputs to local gardening and
food production, but the total effect is likely to be
relatively small.
5) FORESTRY
Decreased soil moisture (Chapin et al. 2014) and lack
of cold winter temperatures are associated with in-
creased insect activity that has reduced growth and
density of white spruce (picea glauca) and changed
forest composition (Wolken et al. 2011). Timber pro-
duction in interior regions could decline, but from a
relatively small base (Barber et al. 2000; Beck et al.
2011). An increase in birch firewood may potentially
offset the reduction in spruce, although the species
composition of future interior Alaskan forests under a
warmer climate is not known (Euskirchen et al. 2009;
Juday et al. 2005).
6) FISHING
Warming ocean temperatures and shifts in coastal
currents have already changed marine ecosystems and
the fisheries they support (Barbeaux et al. 2017; Fellman
FIG. 2. Percentage change in annual HDDs, 2000–15 vs 1950–79. (Source: NWS daily
weather summaries.)
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et al. 2010; Hood et al. 2009; Royer and Grosch 2006).
Some commercial fisheries have shifted location; some
have declined, while others have expanded. Overall,
the changes have increased uncertainty in the fishing
industry. Ocean acidification—not a climate change
effect per se, but also driven by atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations—adds to the uncertainty of fu-
ture commercial fishing in Alaska. Mathis et al. (2014)
concluded that risks to coastal fisheries and fishing
communities were high in southeast and southwestern
Alaska. However, not enough is known about the effects
of acidification on specific harvested or harvestable
species to assess the economic effects.
7) INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Threats to infrastructure from coastal and riparian
erosion caused by the combination of rising sea levels,
thawing permafrost, reduced sea ice, and fall storms
are well known (Alessa et al. 2008; Hong et al. 2014;
Raynolds et al. 2014; White et al. 2007). The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers identified erosion threats to 31
communities, including seven (Bethel, Dillingham,
Kaktovik, Kivalina, Newtok, Shishmaref, and Unalakleet)
requiring partial or complete relocation (USACE
2009). The Corps projected that Kivalina, Newtok, and
Shishmaref may start losing critical infrastructure to
erosion as early as 2020.
Thawing permafrost is also causing widespread and
accelerating damage to public infrastructure not at
risk from erosion (Larsen et al. 2008; Melvin et al.
2017a; USEPA 2017). Economic effects include
shortened useful life of buildings, additional mainte-
nance and repair costs, as well as early reconstruction
and replacement. In addition to imposing costs to re-
pair or replace infrastructure, rupture of water and
sewer lines may temporarily displace residents, con-
taminate drinking water, and impose other less tan-
gible costs (Agnew Beck Consulting 2012; USACE
2008a,b) that increase risks to public health (Brubaker
et al. 2011; Gregory et al. 2006).
In rural Alaska, where surface transportation in-
frastructure is extremely limited, snow and ice offer
a low-cost alternative for moving people, goods, and
heavy industrial equipment. The shorter andmilder cold
season reduces the season length for ice road use, in-
creases risk of travel on river ice, and increases wear and
tear on snow machines. Some of the economic conse-
quences of the loss of overland winter transportation
come in the form of higher costs for extractive industries
and rural Alaskan households, but other effects such
as foregone economic activity (Hinzman et al. 2005) and
increased risk of winter travel are more difficult to
quantify (Reimchen et al. 2009).
8) MARINE AND COASTAL SHIPPING
Melting of sea ice sufficient to open the Northwest
Passage could reduce the distance shipping to or from
North America by 30% (Smith and Stephenson 2013).
Although shipping activity will undoubtedly increase,
significant effects are likely several decades off. Most
of the new shipping will not touch Alaska’s shores,
but merely transit between Pacific and Atlantic tem-
perate zone ports, although the increase in traffic will
bring environmental risks to subsistence resources
(Huntington et al. 2015). Theoretically, the increased
marine transportation could increase resource exploi-
tation and tourism (Larsen and Fondahl 2014; Arctic
Council 2009). New oil and gas exploration and devel-
opment in theU.S. economic zone is unlikely, though, as
the Arctic Ocean waters that are not already accessible
are generally off the continental shelf. Lack of deep-
water ports and vessel services and search and rescue,
environmental response, and icebreaking capacity will
impede expansion of vessel traffic (Arctic Council 2009;
Azzara et al. 2015; Bensassi et al. 2016; Eguíluz et al.
2016). It is unclear to what extent the potential expan-
sion of Arctic Ocean cruises would constitute new visi-
tors to Alaska or merely redistribute existing visitors
from southeast and south-central Alaska.
A longer ice-free shipping season could reduce the
cost of barge service to communities in western and
northern Alaska. It could reduce the cost of shipping
ore from the Red Dog mine and other mines in the
region (Arctic Council 2009), as well as increase cer-
tainty of shipping production facilities and equipment
to North Slope oil fields. Potentially offsetting the ben-
eficial effect of warming on barge service to Alaskan
communities from less ice is the effect on reduced river
discharge. Many communities along rivers are facing
reduced barge service because rivers are becoming
too shallow, which could dramatically increase fuel costs
to residents (National Research Council 2014).
9) SUBSISTENCE
A full discussion of effects of climate change on sub-
sistence is beyond the scope of this paper. We note,
however, that effects on subsistence—systems of
production, distribution, and consumption based on
household production (Wolfe and Walker 1987)—are
economic effects. Climate change is already causing a
variety of changes in subsistence harvest cycles, in-
cluding changes in important food sources (Kofinas et al.
2010; Nelson et al. 2008), loss of some locations used
for fishing and waterfowl hunting, and gain of other
locations (Chapin et al. 2014; Scott et al. 2008). The
largest negative effects stem from melting sea ice and
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associated ecological change in western and northern
Alaska (Hezel et al. 2012; Huntington et al. 2016).
Shrinking seasonal sea ice cover and shifting weather
patterns increase the risk of travel in small boats and
reduce the time period when walrus and other sea ice–
dependent species are available for harvesting. The in-
ability to predict water temperature, turbidity, and wind
for fish harvest activities and the potential decline in
marine mammal harvests increases uncertainty of sub-
sistence food harvests, reducing food security (Gregory
et al. 2006).
10) PUBLIC SAFETY
Warming summers have driven an increase in wildfire
frequency and area burned over the past two decades
(Kelly et al. 2013). Expanding roads and areas with
human settlement over the same period has led to an
increase in human-caused ignitions, which now account
for nearly half of fire starts in Alaska (DeWilde and
Chapin 2006). On the Kenai Peninsula, perception of
increased fire danger associated with trees killed by bark
beetles (Gordon et al. 2013) aligns with similar percep-
tions outside of Alaska (Hicke et al. 2012; Jolly et al.
2012). Increasing fires near inhabited areas leads to a
wide array of costs, including higher firefighting costs,
health and safety impacts, property damage, insurance
losses, and, in the long run, higher costs of fire insurance
for homeowners and businesses (Trainor et al. 2009). In
addition, tourism businesses may experience short-term
losses if visitors avoid recently burned areas.
b. Quantification of important effects
Some of the economic effects summarized above
clearly have larger consequences for the economy
than others, either because they affect more people
or a larger portion of the economy, or because they
have a greater impact on the portion of the economy
that they do affect. Some of these potentially impor-
tant effects, however, are highly uncertain. Here, we
discuss quantification of the effects that are both
highly likely to occur and could have a medium or
large economic effect.
We measure direct effects of changes in ES occurring
in Alaska, including changes in value-added and living
costs, that may be inferred from the information avail-
able. One could apply a spending multiplier to these
direct effects for a small open economy like Alaska’s or
use an input–output table to estimate indirect impacts
on the state’s GDP. However, these secondary multi-
plier effects largely represent a transfer of spending
between Alaska and the rest of the United States, so
they should not be considered net effects from a national
perspective.
c. High certainty, large effect
1) INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE DUE TO
PERMAFROST THAW AND COASTAL EROSION
One study estimated that the cost from 2006 to 2030 of
damage to public infrastructure by thawing permafrost,
flooding, and coastal erosion inAlaska was between $3.6
and $6.1 billion in 2008 dollars (Larsen et al. 2008). This
cost was associated with shortened useful life of build-
ings, requiring early reconstruction and replacement.
Assuming the 2.85% annual real interest rate used in
that study, the cost translates to an average annual cost
of $250–$420 million in 2015 dollars over the same time
period. A more recent estimate using similar method-
ology (USEPA 2017) estimated infrastructure main-
tenance and repair costs to mitigate or remediate
damage from climate warming to the end of the century
of $3.7–$4.5 billion, depending on the climate change
scenario. However, proactive adaptation measures
could reduce that cost to $2.0–$2.5 billion. This estimate
of cumulative effects would be associated with a some-
what smaller annual cost of $110–$270 million between
2015 and 2060 (Melvin et al. 2017a). Because federal
grants are available to build and replace facilities, while
maintenance and repair costs must be financed locally,
public infrastructure maintenance is chronically under-
funded in Alaska, especially in rural areas where infra-
structure is most at risk to permafrost thaw damage
(Colt et al. 2003; Hope and Schaefer 2016). This in-
stitutional reality makes the larger figures based on
shortened useful life of buildings a more reliable esti-
mate of projected costs to society. Both studies ad-
dressed only costs for Alaska’s public road, building,
airport, rail, and pipeline infrastructure, and excluded
commercial and industrial buildings and private homes.
They also excluded losses associated with lack of access
to utilities and drinking water, temporary displacement
of residents when water and sewer lines rupture (Agnew
Beck Consulting 2012; USACE 2008a,b), and associated
costs of increased risks to public health (Brubaker et al.
2011; Gregory et al. 2006).
2) COMMUNITY RELOCATION
Coastal erosion and flooding in some cases will re-
quire that entire communities, or portions of commu-
nities, relocate to safer terrain. Relocation costs for
seven vulnerable communities identified in a 2009 U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study ranged
from $80 to $200 million per community (GAO 2009).
The state of Alaska recently requested $162.4 million
from Congress for three such communities damaged
by erosion and flooding that the U.S. Army Corps of
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Engineers determined need to be completely re-
located within the next 10–15 years (Associated Press
2015). Construction of rock walls, sandbags, riprap
(State of Alaska 2010), and replacement infrastruc-
ture for communities that are partially relocated
(USACE 2009) represent additional costs. Including
costs associated with protecting, reinforcing, and re-
locating infrastructure, $50–$100 million per year
represents a reasonable projection of costs to protect
infrastructure threatened by erosion and move com-
munities to safer ground.
3) SPACE HEATING
Reduced space heating demand represents an im-
portant positive effect of climate warming. Data from
the 2012 Alaska Energy Authority energy end-use study
(WHPacific 2012) show that Alaskans annually use
about 50 million MMBtu to heat residential homes and
18 million MMBtu to heat nonresidential space heating
(i.e., commercial and industrial buildings and public
infrastructure).2 Using regional average MMBtu per
household from the same study and regional aver-
age retail fuel prices from the Alaska Division of
Community and Regional Affairs fuel price survey, we
estimate a regionally weighted average cost of $14 per
MMBtu for residential space heating and $18 per
MMBtu for nonresidential space heating. These figures
imply that expenditures for space heating in Alaska in
2012 amounted to $1.02 billion, or about $1,400 per
person (Table 1).
The change in HDD shown in Fig. 2 implies a
population-weighted average HDD reduction of 6.7%
for Alaska as a whole. Heating cost savings from this
change have already been realized. Assuming an equal
percentage change over the next 35 years, we estimate a
$144 million ($98 million residential, $46 million non-
residential) annual savings to 2050. This estimate has
several limitations. Future energy prices are uncertain.
The annual figure does not account for construction of
new buildings or energy efficiency improvements since
the 2011 (WHPacific 2012) baseline, or for potential
expansion of the building stock over the next several
decades. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to project an
energy cost savings by 2050 of at least $100–$150 million
per year.
d. High certainty, medium effect
1) WILDFIRE
Costs of projected increases in wildfire frequency and
area burned include increased firefighting costs, poten-
tial decreases in tourism, health and safety impacts, and
property damage (Trainor et al. 2009). Of these, fire-
fighting costs and property damage are the most easily
quantified. Alaskan fire seasons are highly variable, but
one stylized fact of change is an increasing frequency of
large fire years (.1 million acres burned) associated
with high firefighting costs and an increased likelihood
of damage to property. The most spent in 1 year fighting
wildfires in Alaska was $110 million, which was spent in
2004. Annual spending averages $10 million per year
(AKDOF 2015). A recent estimate projected an in-
crease in wildfire suppression costs of $25 million more
per year above the 2002–13 annual average, assuming
federal costs are 32% and state and local costs are 68%
of total suppression costs (Melvin et al. 2017b). The cost
could be higher if the footprint of human settlement
expands and the geographic area designated from more
active fire suppression expands accordingly.
Property damage from wildfires is also highly variable
from year to year. Themost expensive fire to date was the
Millers Reach Fire, which destroyed 454 structures, in-
cluding 200 homes in the Matanuska–Susitna Borough in
1996. Nash and Duffy (1997) estimated a total cost of the
Millers Reach Fire of $80 million ($120 million in 2015
prices). Another fire (Sockeye Fire) in the same general
area destroyed another 55 homes and heavily damaged
44 other structures in 2015. A reasonable estimate of
additional property damage is $5–$10 million per year.
Overall, we estimate an incremental cost of fire pro-
tection and property damage of $25–$40 million per year.
2) ICE ROAD TRANSPORTATION
Shorter seasons for ice roads both overland and across
lakes and rivers raise costs for resource extraction
TABLE 1. Estimated energy use and cost for space heating in Alaska, 2012. [Source: Calculated by authors from data presented by
WHPacific (2012) and Alaska Division of Community and Regional Affairs Community Fuel Price Survey (https://www.commerce.
alaska.gov/web/dcra/researchanalysis/fuelpricesurvey.aspx).]
Energy used (million MMBtu) Average cost of energy ($ per MMBtu) Space heating cost ($ million)
Residential 50.4 $13.78 $695.8
Nonresidential 18.4 $17.69 $325.9
Total 68.8 $1,020.7
2 One million MMBtu equals 1 trillion Btu.
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activities (Hinzman et al. 2005), increase cost of living in
remote communities, and impose other less tangible
effects. More permanent roads and bridges are needed,
or else travel and economic activity is curtailed. A 2004
report estimated the cost of ice roads on the North Slope
of Alaska at $100,000 per mile, versus as much as $2
million per mile for a gravel road. Other estimates are
higher for both transportation modes. Design and con-
struction for the 102-mi gravel road to connect Nuiqsut
to the Dalton Highway, including a bridge across the
Colville River, was estimated at $350–$400 million
(BLM 2004). The state of Alaska estimated $350–$385
million to design and construct a road of similar length
to Umiat on the North Slope (Cole 2015), versus an in-
dustry cost estimate of $400,000 per mile for ice roads
(Harball 2017). An order-of-magnitude estimate of the
costs of reduced surface transportation options, derived
from the need to construct 50 mi of new all-season roads
per decade, would be $10–$20 million per year.
3) SUBSISTENCE
Effects on subsistence include shorter and higher-risk
subsistence seasons, decline in marine mammal har-
vests, and effects of food security associated with in-
creased uncertainty of access and harvest (Carothers
et al. 2014; Gregory et al. 2006; Huntington et al. 2013;
McNeeley 2012; Moerlein and Carothers 2012). Rural
Alaskans will likely be able to adapt over time to some
of these changes. Othersmay be unavoidable.We do not
attempt to estimate a dollar value for these effects. No
widely accepted method exists for valuing outputs of a
nonmarket economy (Berman and Kofinas 2004). Even
if such a method did exist, the cost of lost subsistence
products cannot measure the cultural, social, and spiri-
tual dimensions of subsistence livelihoods.
Table 2 summarizes the estimated economic effects of
climate change categorized as relatively certain and
having large or medium economic effects. Overall, di-
rect costs we were able to quantify totaled $230–$430
million dollars per year. Most of this cost relates to
prevention of damage and early replacement of in-
frastructure. The direct costs are offset by a savings of
$100–$150 million annually from reduced space heating
costs. If the added cost of repair and maintenance of
private infrastructure equals that of public infrastruc-
ture, suggested here as a working hypothesis, the net
cost of the items in Table 2, excluding subsistence, could
reach $340–$700 million annually.
4. Discussion
Placing the economic impacts of climate change in
Alaska in the context of the overall economy, the
estimated $340–$700 million annual net cost of the five
relatively certain, relatively large, and readily quantified
effects represents 0.6%–1.3% of Alaska’s GDP in 2015
(BEA 2018). Given the concern about potentially severe
climate change impacts in the Arctic raised in in-
ternational assessments (ACIA 2004; Anisimov et al.
2007), one might reasonably ask why the effect is rela-
tively modest in proportion to the state economy. There
are a number of reasons. First, the five large effects in-
cluded in the total figure represent only the largest and
most certain of potential economic effects. Second, the
figure represents a net effect, and the second-largest
effect—changes in space heating costs—is positive. Ex-
cluding the space heating credit, the cost would be
1.0%–1.6%of the state’s GDP. Perhapsmost important,
though, are the large regional disparities in net effects.
Most of the infrastructure damage and relocation costs
occur in rural Alaskan communities. Rural Alaskans
also experience a bigger share of the nonquantifiable
costs, including significant adverse effects on subsistence
livelihoods in some regions. The majority of benefits
from reduced space heating needs, on the other hand,
accrue to residents of urban areas, who have on average
larger homes, are more likely to work indoors, and
spend more money in businesses with large commercial
spaces to heat.
The uncertainties around projected impacts are large
and diverse. The size of the future Alaskan population
and economy is highly uncertain. Global market forces
TABLE 2. Summary of relatively certain large or medium economic
effects of climate change ($ million per year).
Direct effect (figures enclosed










Change in space heating
requirements
$100–$150
Wildfire fighting costs and
property loss
($20–$40)
Ice road transportation ($10–$20)
Subsistence resources Not estimated
Total net effecta ($230–$430)
a The lower figures for negative effects were added to the lower
estimate of the positive effect to estimate the lower figure for total
net effect. The sum of the upper estimates of negative effects was
added to the high figure for the positive effect to estimate the
upper total net effect. In general, regional and local climate ef-
fects create the largest source of uncertainty, and the absolute
values of all economic effects are correlated with regional climate
outcomes.
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and national policies, such as support for rural commu-
nities, have a much greater role than climate change in
determining the future of the Alaskan economy and are
highly uncertain. These and other changes, such as
effects on Alaska of climate change occurring else-
where, could interact with climate change (the pace of
which is also uncertain) and thereby affect the size of
economic effects. Actual effects of specific environ-
mental changes also depend on technologies available
and adopted at the time, as well as on individual and
collective adaptation decisions.
Gaps in the literature prevented us from evaluating
many economic effects. The most important effect that
needs analysis may be private infrastructure at risk from
permafrost degradation, flooding, and coastal erosion.
Military installations are also missing from the data on at-
risk public infrastructure (Larsen et al. 2008). Better data
are also needed on public and private infrastructure at risk
from wildfire. Additional research is needed to assess cli-
mate change effects on key ecosystem services with po-
tentially large economic consequences. First among these
needs would be better information on long-term effects on
Alaskan fisheries of increasing ocean acidification, which
could interact with warming ocean temperatures. In-
formation is also needed on potential interaction of in-
creasing wildfire frequency with fire management costs
and property damage in the wildland–urban interface.
Some information needed to project economic effects
of climate change is currently unknowable. Economic
effects several decades in the future depend on eco-
nomic activities and the technologies that will evolve
over time in association with climate trends, global
markets, and government policies. Although one can
reasonably project climate trends over the next several
decades, one can only speculate about market, tech-
nology, and policy shifts. Effects of climate-driven
changes in transportation access for extractive in-
dustries depend on size and location of future resource
discoveries. Potential economic activity for Alaskan
cruise ship stopovers depends on evolving global travel
destination preferences. Costs of public infrastructure
repair and replacement depend on government policies
to support rural Arctic communities. We made our as-
sessment assuming current conditions and trends, which
represent only one of the panoply of possible scenarios.
5. Conclusions
We reviewed effects of climate change on ES noted in
the literature, classified the effects into broad categories,
and described the nature of important economic effects.
The review found large negative economic effects asso-
ciatedwith the need to protect and relocate infrastructure
due to permafrost degradation, coastal erosion, and rising
sea level. These negative effects were partially offset by
reduced space heating costs associated withmilder winter
temperatures. We estimated that warming over the past
several decades has already saved households, businesses,
and governments at least $100million annually in heating
costs and will likely save at least that much more over
the next 35 years. Relying on the published literature,
we estimated that five relatively certain, large effects that
could be readily quantified would impose an average
annual net cost of $340–$700 million, or 0.6%–1.3% of
Alaska’s GDP, over this same time period. This figure,
however, includes only the effects that are relatively
certain, near term, and readily quantified with publicly
available information. The literature is incomplete in
some places, such as regarding effects on private in-
frastructure, andmuchmore research needs to be done to
reduce the uncertainties, particularly about effects of
marine environmental change. Nevertheless, these esti-
mates suggest that climate change would impose a sig-
nificant, but relatively modest, negative economic effect.
The pattern of positive and negative economic im-
pacts includes large regional disparities. Small rural
communities subject to coastal erosion, unstable per-
mafrost, or both will face a choice between costly op-
tions of protecting infrastructure from damage and
rebuilding on safer ground. Rural livelihoods including
commercial fishing and subsistence face increasing
uncertainty as ecosystems respond in unpredictable
ways to warming and ocean acidification. Permafrost is
largely absent and coastal erosion is generally much less
severe in south-central Alaska and southern coastal
areas, where most of the Alaskan population resides.
This region will experience benefits of a milder climate
with few negative consequences for infrastructure.
The disparities between net urban benefits of climate
change and net rural costs are probably not unique to
Alaska. However, Alaska’s diverse climatic zones and
uneven settlement pattern perhaps generates larger re-
gional disparities than elsewhere. An important lesson to
be drawn from the Alaska case is that climate change not
only creates economic gains and losses, but also winners
and losers. Policy to reduce conflict and facilitate adap-
tation to climate change might consider how those who
gain could contribute more to financing the costly adap-
tation measures for those who are adversely affected.
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